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ABSTRACT 
  This Article disputes analyses and conclusions presented in an article 
about Pebble Mine published in the Alaska Law Review’s June 2008 issue. 
This Article discusses the history of mining in Alaska and the Pebble Project 
and describes the permitting regime applicable to mining exploration or 
development projects as it has been developed by the Alaska Legislature and 
the United States Congress, implemented by state and federal administrative 
agencies, and interpreted by federal and state courts. The Authors argue that 
the mining industry in Alaska has not historically proved detrimental to the 
fishing industry and that numerous and adequate legal safeguards are 
provided by the existing permitting regime. They also dispute the previous 
article’s conclusion that development of the Pebble resource would harm 
fisheries. This Article concludes that a change in state law by which the 
owners of the Pebble resource are barred from developing the known deposit 
would effect a compensable regulatory taking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article provides a comprehensive view of issues regarding 
large mine permitting in Alaska and, in particular, discusses issues with 
respect to the proposed Pebble mine. It responds to an article, Pebble 
Mine: Fish, Minerals, and Testing the Limits of Alaska’s “Large Mine 
Permitting Process,”1 that was published in the June 2008 issue of the 
Alaska Law Review. The present Authors disagree as to both that article’s 
analysis and its conclusions. 
Like the present Authors, the earlier article’s first named author 
represents, as an attorney, interests with a stake in this controversy. Mr. 
Parker represents those who advocated against the Pebble Project.2 
 
 1. Geoffrey Y. Parker, Frances M. Raskin, Carol Ann Woody, and Lance 
Trasky, Pebble Mine: Fish, Minerals, and Testing the Limits of Alaska’s “Large Mine 
Permitting Process,” 25 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Parker et al.]. 
 2. Mr. Parker has represented Robert Gillam, a vocal opponent of Pebble 
Mine, in litigation over a proposed bridge that could eventually be used for 
Pebble’s transportation needs. See Gillam v. Barton, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1071 
(D. Alaska 2005), aff’d, 200 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2006). Mr. Parker has 
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Carol Ann Woody and Lance Trasky are also high-profile opponents of 
the Pebble Project who spoke out against it in public forums and before 
legislative bodies.3 The authors of this Article, on the other hand, 
represent mining interests, including the Pebble Project. 
In this Article, the Authors respond to the Parker article’s scientific 
and legal arguments against the Pebble Project. Parts II and III discuss 
the history of mining in Alaska and the history of the Pebble Project—
correcting, we believe, inaccurate statements in the earlier article. Parts 
IV and V argue that acid mine drainage and heavy metal leaching is not 
“inevitable” at Pebble, that water quality modeling is reliable, and that 
the dire effects on salmon from low levels of copper predicted by the 
Parker article have never been documented in the natural environment 
or recognized by any federal or state agency.4 
Part VI argues that the existing regime of state and federal laws and 
regulations safeguard against possible negative environmental impacts 
from the Pebble Project. It provides an overview of applicable Alaska 
and federal law and demonstrates how programs developed, 
 
represented both Mr. Gillam and Trout Unlimited in offering comments to the 
Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities criticizing that 
agency’s plans for transportation projects that could serve Pebble Mine. See 
Letter from Geoffrey Parker, Attorney, Law Office of Geoffrey Parker, to Jeff 
Ottesen, Dir., Statewide Planning Div., Alaska Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities 
(Dec. 31, 2005) (on file with the Alaska Law Review). Mr. Parker has also 
testified before the Alaska Legislature on behalf of Mr. Gillam and Trout 
Unlimited. See S.B. 16-POWERS/DUTIES DOTPF/TRANSPORTATION PLAN: 
Hearing on S.B. 16 Before the S. Transportation Standing Comm., 2005 Leg., 24th 
Sess. (Alaska 2005). Mr. Parker also filed comments with the Alaska Department 
of Natural Resources in 2007 on behalf of Renewable Resources Coalition, Trout 
Unlimited, the Nondalton Tribal Council, Nunamta Aulukestai and Bob Gillam, 
opposing the approval of an exploration plan. 
 3. Ms. Woody is a consultant for the Renewable Resources Coalition, which 
opposes Pebble Mine and sponsored ballot initiatives aimed at blocking the 
mine’s development, as described in the Parker article. See Alaska’s Pebble Mine 
Worries Biologist, RED ORBIT, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.redorbit.com/news/ 
science/1329012/alaskas_pebble_mine_worries_biologist/index.html. Mr. 
Trasky has spoken out against Pebble before the Alaska Board of Fisheries. See 
Troy Letherman, "They Don't Want Here a Mine City”: Hard-rock Mining, Pebble 
and the Fight for Iliamna, FISH ALASKA, July 2008, at 78 (describing testimony of 
Mr. Trasky before Alaska Board of Fisheries). 
 4. In the discussions regarding science, it should be noted that, like the 
Parker article, this Article is directed to an audience with a legal background, 
but not with technical and scientific training. It is not appropriate here to fully 
explore the scientific bases behind many of the claims and authorities put 
forward in the Parker piece that are used, in part, to justify its conclusions. 
Although some of those claims are discussed here, the purpose of this Article is 
to provide legal analysis of the proposals for radical legislative change in 
Alaska’s laws governing the environmental regulation of mining projects, 
especially the Pebble mining project. 
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implemented, and enforced by regulatory agencies protect Alaskan 
waters and its marine life. Therefore, the two legislative bills the Parker 
article advocates5 are both unnecessary and harmful. 
Finally, Part VIII discusses the interaction between Alaska takings 
law and potential anti-Pebble regulation and argues that these laws 
would enact a taking of private property for public use and, as such, 
would entitle the project owners to just compensation. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Before discussing the controversy over Pebble Mine, it is necessary 
to provide some background on the history of both the mining and 
salmon industry in Alaska. 
First, declines in salmon runs throughout Alaska prior to statehood 
are attributable to over-fishing,6 not impacts from mining. Outside 
salmon interests harvested Alaska salmon at an unsustainable level.7 For 
instance, canneries commonly employed stream barricades and fish 
traps, wiping out entire fish runs.8 
Next, Alaskans won the fight for statehood with the promise that 
the state would use its immense federal land grant for the purpose of 
developing its natural resource base. The federal government retained 
control over Alaska’s commercial fisheries during the state’s territorial 
period.9 However, federal management of the marine fisheries did not 
effectively conserve salmon resources.10 Salmon runs were so poor by 
the early 1950s that President Eisenhower declared parts of Alaska to be 
 
 5. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 31, 39; see also S.B. 67, 2007 Leg., 25th Sess. 
(Alaska 2007), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/25/Bills/ 
SB0067A.pdf; H.B. 134, 2007 Leg., 25th Sess. (Alaska 2007), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/25/Bills/HB0134A.pdf. 
 6. STEVE COLT, SALMON FISH TRAPS IN ALASKA 6–7 (1999), 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/publications/fishrep/fishtrap.pdf; cf. STEPHEN 
HAYCOX, FRIGID EMBRACE 27 (2002) (noting that early fish traps caught nearly all 
the fish in a run). 
 7. See HAYCOX, supra note 6, at 32. 
 8. Id.; see also COLT, supra note 6, at 8. 
 9. COLT, supra note 6, at 11–12; see also CLAUS-M. NASKE, A HISTORY OF 
ALASKA STATEHOOD 219 (1985); Charles P. Meacham & John H. Clark, Pacific 
Salmon Management—The View from Alaska, 1 ALASKA FISHERY RES. BULL. 76, 76 
(1994), available at http:// www.adfg.state.ak.us/pubs/afrb/vol1_n1/ 
meacv1n1.pdf. 
 10. Testimony of Mr. David Bedford, Deputy Comm’r, Alask Dep’t of Fish & 
Game, to the House Subcomm. on Fisheries and Oceans (2005) [hereinafter 
Bedford] (statement of David Bedford); Steve Pennoyer, Early Management of 
Alaskan Fisheries, 50(4) MARINE FISHERIES REV. 194, 196 (1988); see generally Patricia 
Roppel, The Canneries and Salmon of Alaska, 50(4) MARINE FISHERIES REV., 194, 196 
(1988) (summarizing the history of the salmon cannery industry since 1867). 
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disaster areas.11 In 1959, the total Alaska salmon harvest hit an all-time 
low.12 The following year, Alaska banned fish traps, devices which had 
come to symbolize “outside” control of Alaska’s resources.13 
While Alaskans fought for statehood and the right to control 
natural resources,14 opponents of statehood, including the commercial 
fishing industry,15 argued that Alaska did not have a sufficient economic 
base to support itself and would require heavy subsidies from other 
states.16 To allay these fears, sections 6(a), 6(b), and 6(i) of the Alaska 
Statehood Act17 included: (1) a 103,350,000-acre land grant to the state 
which included all mineral deposit rights, and (2) a requirement that the 
state establish a leasing system for the extraction of minerals from this 
land.18 
Congress granted Alaska all mineral rights in the state land with 
the recognition that nearly all of the land was non-arable and thus had 
little other economic potential.19 Sections 6(a) and 6(b) of the Statehood 
Act expressed Congress’ intent that state land be used to maximize 
Alaska’s mineral resource development, thereby increasing the state’s 
economic self-sufficiency.20 Alaska subsequently became the first and 
 
 11. Roppel, supra note 10, at 196; Meacham & Clark, supra note 9, at 76. 
 12. COLT, supra note 6, at 14. 
 13. Id.; Pennoyer, supra note 10, at 197. 
 14. Bedford, supra note 10. 
 15. STEPHEN HAYCOX, ALASKA: AN AMERICAN COLONY 269 (2002); see also 
NASKE, supra note 9, at 249–51 (discussing opposition from fishing industry and 
its Congressional allies to both Alaskan statehood and the transfer of fisheries 
jurisdiction to the state). 
 16. 104 CONG. REC. 9498 (1958) (statement of Rep. Smith); see also Trs. for 
Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 335–37 (Alaska 1987) (reciting Congressional 
history leading up to passage of Statehood Act); 104 CONG. REC. 12,297 (1958) 
(statement of Sen. Talmadge) (inferring Alaska’s inability to support itself as a 
state from special concessions made in Statehood Act). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 85-508, §§ 6(a), 6(i), 72 Stat. 339, at 340, 342 (1958). 
 18. Id.; see also Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 336 (reciting Congressional 
testimony of Alaska Territorial Senator William Egan that the mineral potential 
of the land grant would provide great economic benefit to Alaska). 
 19. Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 336, n.23 (citing 104 CONG. REC. 12,336 (1958) 
(statement of Sen. Byrd)). 
 20. Id. (quoting Statehood for Alaska: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Territorial 
and Insular Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 201–02 (1957) (statements of Rep. Miller and William Egan, Alaska 
Territorial Senator and President of the Alaska Constitutional Convention)); see 
also 104 CONG. REC. 12,012 (1958) (statement of Sen. Jackson); 104 CONG. REC. 
9360–61 (1958) (statement of Rep. Dawson). Under section 6(b) of the Alaska 
Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), “Alaska [was] permitted to 
select over a twenty-five year period after its admission into the Union, up to 
102,550,000 acres from the public lands of the United States in Alaska which 
[were] vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved at the time of their selection.” 
Udall v. Kalerak, 396 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 1968). “[U]nder section 6(a), Alaska 
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only state to devote an article in its constitution to guarantee the 
“maximum use” of the state’s natural resources “consistent with the 
public interest.”21 
Statehood also gave Alaska the jurisdiction to manage its own 
fisheries.22 While federal management left Alaska’s salmon fisheries on 
the brink of collapse,23 the salmon made a remarkable comeback largely 
due to well-executed state management.24 Today, Alaska salmon are 
thriving.25 
Finally, as Alaska’s salmon resources rebounded, the state’s mining 
industry grew dramatically, providing a significant benefit to the state’s 
budget and economy. The state’s mining industry currently generates 
over $4 billion in annual income.26 Revenue to the state from the 
minerals industry totaled $179 million in 2007.27 
Furthermore, the Alaska mining industry generates thousands of 
high wage jobs throughout the state—the mineral mining and mining 
support industry employed more than 10,000 workers in 2006 and 
2007.28 In 2007, both the mineral mining and mining support industries 
paid an average monthly income that was approximately more than 
double Alaska’s average monthly salary that year.29 
 
was permitted to select some 800,000 acres of land for the purpose of furthering 
the development and expansion of its communities.” Id. at 749. 
 21. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“It is the policy of the State to encourage 
the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them 
available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.”) 
 22. See Pennoyer, supra note 10, at 197. 
 23. Laine Welch, Alaska Statehood is Pinned to Salmon Industry, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 2008. 
 24. Meacham & Clark, supra note 9, at 77; John H. Clark et al., The Commercial 
Salmon Fishery in Alaska, 12 ALASKA FISHERY RES. BULL. 1, 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.adfg.state.ak.us/pubs/afrb/vol12_n1/clarv12n1.pdf. 
 25. Clark, et al. supra note 24, at 6; Bedford, supra note 10. 
 26. Alaska's Mineral Industry Now Worth Record $4 Billion, ALASKA J. COM., 
Nov. 16, 2008, available at http://alaskajournal.com/stories/111608/ 
loc_20081116009.shtml; Elizabeth Bluemink, Alaska Mines Produce Record $3.4 
Billion, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18, 2008; ALASKA MINERS ASS’N, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ALASKA’S MINING INDUSTRY 1 (2008), 
http://www.alaskaminers.org/ mcd07sum.pdf. 
 27. ALASKA MINERALS COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 2008 ALASKA MINERALS 
COMMISSION iv (2008), http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/oed/minerals/pub/ 
mineralsreport2008_web.pdf. 
 28. See D.J. SZUMIGALA, ET AL, ALASKA’S MINERAL INDUSTRY 2006: SPECIAL 
REPORT 61, at v (2006), http://www.dggs.dnr.state.ak.us/webpubs/dggs/sr/ 
text/sr061.PDF [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT 61]; D.J. SZUMIGALA, R.A. HUGHES & 
L.A. HARBO, ALASKA’S MINERAL INDUSTRY 2007: SPECIAL REPORT 62, at 2–5 (2007), 
http://www.dggs.dnr.state.ak.us/webpubs/dggs/sr/text/sr062.PDF 
[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT 62]. 
 29. ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., PRELIMINARY 2007 
QUARTERLY CENSUS OF EMPLOYMENT & WAGES 1–2, http:// 
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II.  PEBBLE’S ECONOMIC IMPACT 
Given its large size, the Pebble Project could bring much needed 
economic diversification and growth to southwest Alaska.30 In 2007, 
over 1000 workers were involved in oil exploration activities, including 
over 140 residents of more than 16 communities in the Bristol Bay area.31 
The Pebble Project presents an opportunity to improve the 
economy in the Bristol Bay region, an area where 73% of the inhabitants 
are Alaska Natives.32 In 1999, 24% of Alaska Native Corporation 
shareholders in Bristol Bay lived at or below the poverty line.33 
Additionally, the Bristol Bay region has the second-worst rate of 
unemployment among the twelve Alaska Native Corporation regions.34 
Making matters worse, Bristol Bay has high prices for commodities such 
as groceries and fuel.35 Its electricity prices are also the highest in 
Alaska, averaging more than double the prices in Anchorage.36 
Morever, diversification is necessary because the fishing industry 
cannot solve all of the region’s economic woes.  This is particularly true 
because, although the commercial salmon fishing industry plays an 
important role in Bristol Bay, much of the benefits do not accrue locally. 
Of the roughly $98 million the Bristol Bay fisheries generated in 2005, 
only 11% went to local residents, while 54.2% went to non-Alaskans.37 
Similarly, between 2001 and 2005, between 77.3% and 84.6% of Bristol 
 
www.labor.state.ak.us/research/ee/ee07.pdf. The average monthly income in 
2007 for mining occupations was $6884 and the average monthly income in 2006 
for support occupations was $7183. Id. The average monthly income in Alaska 
was $3627. Id. at 1. 
 30. ALASKA MINERALS COMM'N, supra note 27, at 8; see also Alaska Office of 
Economic Development Webpage on Minerals Development, 
http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/oed/minerals/mining.htm (last visited Apr. 
14, 2009). 
 31. SPECIAL REPORT 62, supra note 28, at 21; see also letter from Alaska Dep’t of 
Commerce, Cmty., Econ. Dev. to Alaska Bd. of Fisheries (Nov. 21, 2006). 
 32. ALASKA NATIVE POLICY CTR., OUR CHOICES, OUR FUTURE: ANALYSIS OF THE 
STATUS OF ALASKA NATIVES REPORT 2004, at 110 (2004), http:// 
www.firstalaskans.org/documents_fai/ANPCa.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 78. 
 34. Id. at 78, 100. The figure for non-Natives living in poverty in Bristol Bay 
stood at 5%. Id. 
 35. Id. at 76–77, 110–11; see generally Gigi Berardi, Natural Resource Policy, 
Unforgiving Geographies, and Persistent Poverty in Alaska Native Villages, 38 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 85 (1998) (analyzing the causes of systemic poverty in rural Alaska). 
For instance, the cost of food averages about 50% higher in rural Alaska than in 
Anchorage. ALASKA NATIVE POLICY CTR., supra note 32, at 77. 
 36. ALASKA NATIVE POLICY CTR., supra note 32, at 76–77, 110–11. 
 37. Gross Earnings of Seafood Harvesters Fishing in Bristol Bay Waters by 
Residency: Bristol Bay Region 2005, http://www.labor.state.ak.us/research/ 
seafood/BristolBay/BBFHVErngRes.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
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Bay seafood processing wages went to non-Alaska residents,38 and only 
6% to 9.2% of seafood processing workers lived in the Bristol Bay region 
during that time period.39 
Additionally, salmon prices have trended downward in recent 
years.40 Thus, despite large harvests, Bristol Bay’s seasonal salmon 
fishery workforce declined 19% between 2000 and 2007.41 Competition 
from farmed Atlantic salmon caused demand for frozen Bristol Bay 
salmon to drop.42 In 1980, 98% of the world supply of harvested salmon 
was wild, but by 2001 only 37% was wild.43 This trend should continue 
due to the inherent economic advantages of farmed fish relative to wild 
salmon.44 
III.  PEBBLE PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
A. The Project Has Yet to Be Designed 
The Parker article describes “Pebble Mine and Its Facilities” in great 
detail,45 but his source is an outdated conceptual design. 
The Pebble Limited Partnership has not completed an integrated 
development plan for the two deposits discovered at Pebble.46 The 
company deferred “[d]evelopment and permitting timelines” to conduct 
more studies to support the development of the near-surface ore at 
Pebble West and the deeper, richer ore at Pebble East.47 In the 
company’s words, “The Pebble Partnership will continue its 
 
 38. Bristol Bay Region Seafood Industry, 2000-2005, http:// 
www.labor.state.ak.us/research/seafood/BristolBay/BBoverall.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2009). 
 39. Local Seafood Processing Workforce, 2001-2006, http:// 
www.labor.state.ak.us/research/seafood/BristolBay/BBSFPLocal.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
 40. See GUNNAR KNAPP, PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE BRISTOL BAY SALMON PRICES 
III-2 (2004), http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/iser/people/knapp/knapp_BB_ 
Price_Projections_October_2004.pdf. In 2004, Bristol Bay salmon averaged 
roughly one-third of its 1980s per-pound price. Id. at III–3, fig.III–3. 
 41. Brigitta Windisch-Cole & Josh Warren, Employment in Alaska’s Fisheries, 
ALASKA ECON. TRENDS, Nov. 2008, at 7, available at http://labor.state.ak.us/ 
trends/nov08.pdf. 
 42. KNAPP, supra note 40, at VII–13 to VII–15; Josh Eagle et al., Why Farm 
Salmon Outcompete Fishery Salmon, 28 MARINE POL’Y 259, 259 (2004). Atlantic 
salmon farming is illegal in Alaska. ALASKA. STAT. § 16.40.100(d) (2008). 
 43. KNAPP, supra note 40, at 2. 
 44. Eagle, supra note 42, at 262. 
 45. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 12–14. 
 46. See Pebble Mine Project Alaska, http://www.pebblepartnership.com/ 
pages/project–information/project–overview.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 47. Id. 
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engineering, environmental and socio–economic studies throughout 
2009 in order to support the preparation of a proposed development 
plan that will be submitted for government and public review in the 
next few years.”48 
Many fundamental issues remain undecided including: whether 
there will be an open pit mine; how much power will be needed and 
how it will be generated; and how to execute the design of infrastructure 
such as the mill, waste storage facilities, and roads. Although the 
company expects to submit a proposed mine development plan with its 
permit applications within the next few years,49 more modifications 
could be required by permitting agencies and other public demands.50 
B. Known Geologic Processes Mitigate Acid Rock Drainage 
The Parker article’s concerns regarding acid rock drainage51 are 
misplaced for two reasons. First, the Pebble ore deposits are low-sulfur 
deposits. Second, and more generally, current waste containment 
techniques imposed by permitting requirements will adequately prevent 
drainage of acid sulfides. 
Although ore at the Pebble deposit may contain metallic sulfides, it 
is unlikely that the deposit contains high sulfide concentrations because 
Pebble is a porphyry deposit.52 Such deposits are typically low grade, 
low sulfide deposits with around 5% sulfide.53 However, even if the 
deposit contains sulfides, their mere presence in ore does not by itself 
produce sulfuric acid. Numerous factors and processes can neutralize or 
mitigate the production of acid rock drainage.54 For instance, the host 
rock associated with metal mining activities, like those proposed at 
Pebble, often contain carbonate and silicate minerals which neutralize 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Pebble Mine Project Alaska, http://www.pebblepartnership.com/ 
pages/project–information/regulatory–review.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 15–16. While the Parker article uses the term 
“acid mine drainage,” “acid rock drainage” is more typically used in the geology 
community. Email from Stephen Day, Geologist, SRK Consulting, to Jim 
Wilkson, Associate, Hartig Rhodes Hoge & Lekisch PC (Dec. 2, 2008) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter “Day email”]. See also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 
97.240 (2008). 
 52. Charles Hawley, Quaterra Resources, Vice-President, and Millrock 
Resources, Director, Response to Parker et al. Law Review Article (unpublished 
memorandum regarding geology of Pebble deposit) (on file with author). 
 53. Id. 
 54. SPECIAL WASTE BRANCH, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA530–R–94–036, 
TECHNICAL DOCUMENT: ACID MINE DRAINAGE 6–7 (1994). 
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sulfuric acid produced by oxidation of certain sulfide minerals.55 Indeed, 
sulfuric rock drainage is not likely to occur when carbonate and silicate 
minerals: (1) are closely associated with the sulfides; (2) are available for 
reaction with the sulfides; and (3) statistically exceed the acid-producing 
potential of the sulfide minerals.56 
Pebble’s geologic reports show that neutralizing minerals exceed 
acid producing minerals in most of its rock and the majority (greater 
than 90%) of its tailings.57 However, the Parker article—which implies 
that Pebble will produce large amounts of acid rock drainage simply 
because the deposit “contains” sulfides—fails to account for these 
factors. 
C. Federal and State Law and the Mitigation of Any Potential Acid 
Rock Drainage 
The Parker article implies that if acid rock drainage occurs, it will 
simply flow into surrounding waters.58 However, even if some acid rock 
drainage occurs, mitigation and treatment measures imposed by the 
permitting process will ensure that any drainage will not flow into 
nearby surface waters. 
These strict regulatory standards for mitigation and treatment 
require new technologies that can control the entry of acid rock drainage 
and associated contaminants into surface water by controlling the 
oxidization of sulfides.59 For instance, sulfide minerals likely to produce 
acid rock drainage may be inundated with water to halt oxidization. 
Oxygen has limited solubility in water, so only minor oxidation of 
sulfides occurs in water.60 Sulfide minerals may also be overlain with a 
dry “cap” of materials such as soils or geosynthetics (man-made 
products) that limit the sulfides’ exposure to air.61 These are just a few 
 
 55. 1 STEFFEN ROBERTSON AND KIRSTEN, INC. ET AL., DRAFT ACID ROCK 
DRAINAGE TECHNICAL GUIDE 2–8 (1989). 
 56. See ANDREW A. SOBEK ET AL., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA–600/2–78-054, 
FIELD AND LABORATORY METHODS APPLICABLE TO OVERBURDENS AND MINE SOILS 3 
(1978); JEFFREY G. SKOUSEN & PAUL F. ZIEMKIEWICZ, ACID MINE DRAINAGE 
CONTROL AND TREATMENT 17 (2d ed. 1996). 
 57. Day email, supra note 51; PEBBLE PROJECT, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
BASELINE STUDIES 2004 PROGRESS REPORTS, CH. 8: GEOCHEMICAL 
CHARACTERIZATION AND ARD/ML at 8–13 (2005), available at 
http://dnr.alaska.gov/mlw/mining/largemine/pebble/2004_reports/pr_ch08.
pdf. 
 58. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 15–16. 
 59. See infra Part V.D.1. 
 60. Day email, supra note 51. 
 61. MINE ENVIRONMENT NEUTRAL DRAINAGE (MEND) 2004, DESIGN, 
CONSTRUCTION AND PERFORMANCE MONITORING OF COVER SYSTEMS FOR WASTE 
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general examples of how mining technology could be used to prevent 
acid rock drainage. Like the Parker article, this Article is a legal analysis 
rather than an engineering discussion, but it is appropriate to mention 
the current technology that is available to satisfy permitting 
requirements. 
IV.  COPPER’S TOXICITY IS OVERSTATED IN THE PARKER ARTICLE 
Part III of the Parker article is devoted to an argument that 
dissolved metals, such as copper, are toxic to fish.62 It refers in passing to 
the fact that copper is essential to life.63 However, the principal scientific 
authority the Parker article relies upon strongly emphasizes copper’s 
importance—it begins its chapter on copper by emphasizing the 
element’s essential nature, mentions that it is “part of about thirty 
enzymes and glycoproteins” and then proceeds to list nearly a dozen 
important examples.64 Indeed, insufficient copper in salmon diets results 
in poor growth.65 Copper mobilized from spine and muscle tissue is 
important for female salmon preparing to spawn, and it also appears to 
be essential for reproductive success.66 
 
ROCK AND TAILINGS, MEND 2.21.4 a–e (July 2004); see also Day email, supra note 
51 (regarding acid rock drainage control methods). 
 62. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 17–21. 
 63. Id. at 17. 
 64. ELSA M. SORENSEN, METAL POISONING IN FISH 235–36 (1991). Ms. Sorensen 
also discusses homeostatic (internal physiological and biochemical control) 
mechanisms that keep the forms and concentrations of copper in fish tissues at 
precisely the right levels. Cf. Martina G. Vijver et al., Internal Metal Sequestration 
and its Ecotoxicological Relevance: A Review, 38 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4705, 4705 
(2004) (analyzing organisms’ ability “to control metal concentrations in certain 
tissues of their body”). The National Research Council (NRC) lists the minimum 
dietary requirements of copper for rainbow trout as 3 mg/kg/day and for 
Atlantic salmon as 5 mg/kg/day. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON FISH NUTRITION, NUTRIENT REQUIREMENTS OF FISH 19–20 (1993). The NRC also 
reported on reduced heart cytochrome c oxidase and reduced liver copper-zinc 
superoxide dismutase (important enzymes) activities in copper-deficient fish. Id. 
Fish fed low copper diets showed reduced growth rates and cataract formation. 
Id. However, dietary supplements of copper greater than about 700 mg/kg/day 
led to reduced growth in rainbow trout, suggesting a maximum dietary amount. 
Id. 
 65. See Takeshi Watanabe et al., Availability of Minerals in Fish Meal to Fish, 1 
ASIAN FISHERIES SCI. 175, 182 (1988) (“The total deletion of trace minerals from 
fish meal diet also caused cataracts along with exophthalmus and depressed 
growth in chum salmon fry during a thirteen week study.”). 
 66. See Hugh A. Poston & George Ketola, Chemical Composition of Mature and 
Spawning Atlantic Salmon from Different Locations, 51 THE PROGRESSIVE FISH-
CULTURIST 133 (1989). 
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Parker’s statement that “concentrations [of copper] just above the 
amount required for growth and reproduction can be highly toxic”67 
ignores a critical consideration: the form of copper in the fish’s 
environment. Various factors govern the toxicity of copper. Virtually all 
forms of copper toxicity in fish are associated with the “free” cupric 
(Cu2+) ion.68 Research shows that copper toxicity is so strongly 
influenced by factors such as hardness, pH, dissolved organic 
compounds (DOC), and particulates that total aqueous concentration is 
both a poor measure of bioavailability and an inadequate tool for the 
development of water quality criteria.69 Indeed, some researchers have 
recommended adjustments in generic water quality criteria when water 
quality at a particular site deviates from the “standard” water used in 
laboratory experiments.70 Researchers have even concluded that copper 
in rainwater is predominantly in the form of strongly complexed (and 
non-toxic) species, both in dissolved and particulate phases; free Cu2+ 
ions were found to be present at concentrations of 1/1,000th to 
1/10,000th of total copper, and is unlikely to be available to organisms.71 
Copper is an abundant element in the earth’s crust and appears 
naturally in surface waters. Concentrations of copper in natural waters 
unaffected by human activities range from 1 to 10 micrograms per liter.72 
The geometric mean concentration for copper derived from thousands 
of surface measurements of United States waters is 4.2 micrograms per 
liter.73 
 
 67. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 17. 
 68. SORENSEN, supra note 64, at 236–46; see also Victoria A. Kjoss et al., Effects 
of Different Ligands on the Bioaccumulation and Subsequent Depuration of Dietary Cu 
and Zn in Juvenile Rainbow Trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss), 63 CAN. J. OF FISHERIES 
AND AQUATIC SCI. 412, 418 (2006); Katherine L. Sciera et al., Influence of Multiple 
Water-Quality Characteristics on Copper Toxicity to Fathead Minnows (Pimephales 
promelas), 23 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY 2900, 2904–05 (2004). 
 69. Sciera, supra note 68, at 2900; see also Svante Winberg et al., The Effect of 
Cu (II) on the Electro-olfactogram (EOG) of the Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar L) in 
Artificial Freshwater of Varying Inorganic Carbon Concentrations, 24 ECOTOXICOLOGY 
AND ENVTL. SAFETY 167, 167 (1992); Melissa Schwartz et al., Natural Organic 
Matter Quality Influences the Degree of Reduction of Metal Toxicity to Fish, SOCIETY 
OF ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, 23RD ANNUAL MEETING (2002). 
 70. Jonathan Bearr et al., Suspended Solids and Copper Toxicity in Waters with 
Low Hardness and Alkalinity, SOCIETY OF ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, 23RD 
ANNUAL MEETING (2002). 
 71. Melanie Witt et al., Organic Complexation of Copper in Rainwater AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF LIMNOLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY ANNUAL MEETING (2004); see also 
Lucinda J. Spokes et al., The Role of Organic Matter in Controlling Copper Speciation 
in Precipitation, 30 ATMOSPHERIC ENVTL. 3959, 3962 (1996). 
 72. OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 440/5–84–031, AMBIENT 
WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR COPPER–1984 1 (1985). 
 73. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR COPPER 135 (2004). 
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Parker asserts that copper has been shown to cause physiological 
and behavioral effects at concentrations “below the accepted criterion 
for aquatic life in Alaska (<9 μg Cu/L).”74 Leaving aside that the aquatic 
life criterion in Alaska is variable based on ambient water hardness,75 
the alleged harmful effects at low copper concentrations have been 
examined only individually in published studies. While Parker states 
that “[c]oncentrations below the accepted criterion for aquatic life in 
Alaska (<9 μg Cu/L) have produced . . . documented effects on fish,”76 
his own authorities fail to support this assertion when applied to natural 
systems. 
V.  THE EXISTING REGULATORY AND PERMITTING REGIME FOR 
MINES IN ALASKA 
The laws governing the development of Alaska’s natural resources, 
including mining projects, are designed to protect fisheries and the 
environment. While the Parker article is critical of Alaska law,77 the 
State’s limitations on how natural resources may be developed 
demonstrate a legislative, administrative, and judicial commitment to 
protect the environment. These laws were drafted to implement the 
Alaska Constitution. The following section describes how existing 
Alaska environmental laws, supplemented by applicable federal and 
local laws and by laws authorizing and regulating the acquisition of 
property interests in public natural resources, regulate mining projects 
and impose numerous overlapping safeguards to protect fisheries and 
other natural resources. 
A. Overview 
An effective permitting regime for a large-scale natural resources 
development project must address new data on the environmental 
impacts of the project, changes in technology, and changes in the 
political consensus concerning environmental risks and costs. The 
administrative agencies charged with implementing the permitting 
process have the expertise to consider these factors in the ultimate 
permitting decisions and in discretionary administration of permits after 
they are issued. Therefore, agency discretion in the permitting process is 
essential because it preserves the ability to respond to specific issues 
 
 74. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
 75. OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA–882–R–07–001, AQUATIC 
LIFE AMBIENT FRESHWATER QUALITY CRITERIA–COPPER 16–17 (2007). 
 76. Parker et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
 77. Id. at 21–31. 
REEVES_FINAL.DOC 5/4/2009  2:45:21 PM 
2009 PEBBLE MINE RESPONSE 15 
raised by a project. This discretion is fundamental to modern 
administrative and environmental law.78 
Investors risking capital in large-scale, long term projects require 
some degree of security, predictability, and protection against changes 
that could impair or destroy their investments. On the other hand, the 
public must preserve its ability to adapt to changing conditions, even 
when that response adversely affects investors. The dynamic tension 
between these two conflicting imperatives is directly addressed by 
constitutional principles. One principle is that, within certain limits not 
yet well defined by the Supreme Court, today’s legislatures and public 
regulatory bodies do not have the power to preempt the prerogatives of 
future legislatures to change the laws.79 Another principle addresses the 
taking of property by regulation.80 
A second important attribute of an effective permitting process is 
agency discretion guided by objective standards and informed through 
procedural safeguards. Potential changes to the law should not 
compromise agency discretion by prohibiting agency decision-makers 
from exercising their judgment on technical issues. 
As discussed below, laws related to mine permitting are dynamic 
and robust, to ensure that regulatory agencies can be responsive to new 
information and can provide ongoing oversight throughout the life of a 
project and reclamation. These laws protect the environment and the 
interests of the public and have allowed the responsible development of 
Alaska’s natural resources. 
B. The Required Federal and State Permits for Large Mining Projects 
Like Pebble 
The development of any large mining project in Alaska can begin 
only after the project receives various local, state, and federal 
government permits, as well as other required authorizations. This array 
of regulatory processes ensures a detailed analysis of a project within 
the context of applicable environmental laws and multiple land use 
plans. 
The Alaska Department of Natural Resources Office of Project 
Management and Permitting coordinates the state’s review of any 
 
 78. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843–46 (1984); Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 
896, 903 (Alaska 1987). 
 79. See, e.g., Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150 (Ind. 1864); Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 
213, 224 (Pa. 1938); Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623, 628 (Wi. 1861). 
 80. See infra Part VII. 
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proposed project.81 This coordination merely supplements reviews 
required by federal or state administrative agencies under their 
individual permitting schemes; none of the other agencies cedes any of 
its statutory authority to the coordinating agency.82 The process formally 
begins after the proponent defines the proposed project and seeks 
authorization to undertake that project.83 Many state and federal 
agencies engage in discussions with project applicants and with the 
public on baseline information requirements and other potential project-
related issues prior to the submission of permit applications.84 
There is no single “permit to mine.” A substantial number of 
permits for specific components of a project are needed, and they can be 
issued only after public review during the permit adjudication process 
or as part of the overall review under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA).85 The NEPA review triggers the environmental impact 
statement (EIS) process, which requires a review of a project’s potential 
cumulative impacts.86 
A large mine requires approximately fifty or more permits, 
approvals, and other authorizations. A mining project is likely to require 
numerous federal permits from various agencies, including the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),87 the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers,88 the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),89 the U.S. 
 
 81. See Office of Project Management and Permitting, http:// 
dnr.alaska.gov/commis/opmp/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See, e.g., Transportation Projects, http://dnr.alaska.gov/commis/opmp/ 
transportation/index.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (discussing project 
management process for transportation projects). 
 84. See, e.g., id. 
 85. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) et 
seq., establishes national environmental policy and goals for the protection, 
maintenance, and enhancement of the environment and provides a process for 
implementing these goals within the federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. NEPA 
established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). Id. 
 86. See infra Part VI.C. 
 87. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006) (historical and cultural resources 
protection); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (pollutant discharge elimination system); 
Stormwater Construction and Operation Permit, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2006) 
(municipal and industrial stormwater discharges); Section 404 Permit Review, 33 
U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (dredged or fill material); 40 C.F.R. § 112 (2006) (oil spill 
prevention, control, and countermeasure plan); 40 C.F.R. §§ 270 (2008) 
(hazardous waste permit program). 
 88. See e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006) (historical and cultural resources 
protection); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1343–44 (2006) (water pollution prevention and control); 
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (discharge of dredge or fill materials into U.S. waters). 
 89. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 661 (2006) (agency coordination regarding fish and 
wildlife); 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006) (agency consultation regarding Endangered 
Species Act). 
REEVES_FINAL.DOC 5/4/2009  2:45:21 PM 
2009 PEBBLE MINE RESPONSE 17 
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS),90 the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),91 
and the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT).92 Also, a mining 
project will require a number of Alaska state permits administered by 
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR),93 the Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC),94 the Department of Fish and Game 
(ADF&G), and the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public 
Facilities.95 In addition, local land use regulations apply.96 This detailed, 
thorough, and pervasive mine permitting scheme often is all but ignored 
by those who oppose a mining project. Ignoring them gives a seriously 
distorted view of the regulatory environment in which a mine is 
developed and operated. 
 
 90. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 661–67(e) (2006) (agency coordination regarding fish 
and wildlife); 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2006) (bald eagle protection); 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 
(2006) (migratory bird protection); 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006) (agency consultation 
regarding Endangered Species Act). 
 91. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. §§ 114–15, 118 (2008) (permit for construction for a 
bridge or causeway across navigable waters). 
 92. See, e.g., Hazardous Materials Registration Number, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101 et 
seq. (2006) (transportation of hazardous materials). 
 93. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.841 (2008) (fish passage permit); ALASKA 
STAT. § 16.05.871 (2008) (fish habitat permit); ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035(e) (2008) 
(tidelands lease); ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.05.110–.120 (2008) (material sale); ALASKA 
STAT. § 38.05.205(c) (2008) (upland mining lease); ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.255(a) 
(2008) (millsite lease); ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.850 (2008) (road, power line, and 
pipeline rights of way); ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.15.050–.060 (2008) (burn permit); 
ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.080 (2008) (cultural resources authorizations); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 43.65.010 (2008) (mining license); ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035 (2008) (permit to 
appropriate water); ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.155 (2008) (temporary water use 
permit); ALASKA STAT. § 46.17.040 (2008) (certificate of approval to construct and 
operate a dam); ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.094–.100 (2008) (coastal project 
consistency determination); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.800 (2008) (plan of 
operations approval); Miscellaneous Land Use Permit, ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 
11, § 96.10 (2008) (miscellaneous land use permit). 
 94. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (requiring that applicants for federal 
licenses or permits for the operation of facilities which may result in discharges 
into navigable waters obtain certification that discharges will comply with 
federal law); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.100 (2008) (waste management, disposal, and 
discharge authorication); ALASKA STAT. § 46.14.120 (2008) (air quality control 
permits to construct and to operate); ALASKA STAT. § 46.14.140 (2008) (emission 
control permit); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 31.020 (2008) (food establishment 
operation); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §§ 75.415(c), .420(d) (2008) (oil discharge 
prevention and contingency plan); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 80.200 (2008) 
(approval to construct and operate a public water supply system). 
 95. See, e.g., Approval to Transport Hazardous Materials, ALASKA ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 17, § 25.200 (2008). 
 96. See, e.g., Title 21 Rewrite Project: Girdwood, http:// 
www.muni.org/planning/prj_T21_Girdwood.cfm (Apr. 2, 2009). 
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C. Problems with the Parker Article’s Analysis of Alaska’s 
Permitting Regime 
First, despite the general claim that Alaska law has failed to 
properly protect the environment,97 the Parker article curiously cites no 
example of a large-scale mine operating in Alaska and permitted under 
state and federal laws that failed in any material way to protect the 
fisheries resources.98 Alaska currently has five large mines in operation. 
The State of Alaska subjects each of these to a five-year environmental 
audit.99  The potential environmental impacts of any proposed very 
large mining project in Alaska would be evaluated during the 
permitting process and the ultimate authorizations would impose 
specific conditions on the development, operation, and eventual closure 
of any such mine.100 
Second, the Parker article relied heavily on the Kuipers Report,101 a 
study commissioned by Earthworks, a mining industry critic,102 and 
ignores the questionable validity of that report. The report concluded 
 
 97. See Parker, supra note 1, at 4. 
 98. To the contrary, the Center for Science in Public Participation (CSP2), a 
non-profit corporation that provides research, education, and technical advice to 
mining-related entities, has applauded the environmental audit requirement 
imposed on mines by the Alaska Department of Natural Resources and Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation via lease and/or reclamation plan 
conditions. Alaska – News from the North, THE LOGBOOK OF CSP2 (The Ctr. for Sci. 
in Pub. Participation, Bozeman, Mont.), Spring 1999, at 1. CSP2 reported that the 
environmental audit of compliance history, operator procedures, and agency 
performance in upholding regulatory obligations could be an “excellent tool” for 
monitoring environmental performance for both mine operators and regulators. 
Id. James Kuipers, P.E., the author of the study relied upon so heavily by the 
Authors, was employed by CSP2 when the Spring 1999 newsletter was 
published. See also Availability of Bonds to Meet Federal Requirements for Mining, Oil 
and Gas Projects: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Res., Subcomm. on Energy and 
Mineral Res., 107th Cong. 53 (2002) (statement of Jim Kuipers, Consulting Mine 
Engineer, Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Participation). 
 99. Ed Fogels, Presentation before the Alaska Department of Natural 
Resources Office of Project Management and Permitting: The Process and 
Requirements for Large Mine Permit Applications in Alaska (Jan. 18, 2008) (on 
file with author). 
 100. See supra Part V.B; see infra Part V.D, and Part VI. 
 101. See Parker, supra note 1, at 22–23 (setting out conclusions made by the 
Kuipers Report regarding reliability of water quality predictions used by agency 
personnel making mine permitting decisions). 
 102. Earthworks has been described as the “leading anti-mining group in the 
world” by industry officials. Rose Ragsdale, Mining report stirs industry buzz, 
MINING NEWS, Jan. 28, 2007 (comments of Laura Skaer, executive director of the 
Northwest Mining Association). Earthworks is often a party to lawsuits against 
mining companies. See, e.g., Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. Haines, No. CV. 05-
1057-PK, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54884 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 2006). 
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that water quality predictions developed during the permitting process 
for a mine can be incorrect for two general reasons: (1) the science of 
mine water quality prediction is imperfect, and (2) the predictions are 
imperfectly applied by regulators.103 The Parker article relies on this 
conclusion to argue that existing permitting regimes are inadequate.104 
Notably, the study did not use a fair sample of mines to obtain its 
conclusions. Criteria used to select the twenty-five mines included the 
following “priorities”: 
  mines with long histories and NEPA documentation from new 
project to reclamation and closure (that is, mines permitted 
long ago); 
  mines with different proximities to water resources but 
indicating water quality impacts[;] 
  mines that conducted some geochemical testing, and if 
possible, some water quality modeling; 
  mines with potentials to generate acid and leach contaminants 
into water resources[.]105 
These criteria resulted in a sample population that is skewed 
toward mines with water quality impacts. The bias is especially 
pronounced in the second criterion since mines were not included in the 
study when (1) no impacts were predicted and none occurred, and (2) 
impacts were predicted but no impacts occurred. 
Generally, the Kuipers Report concludes that a credible model for 
water quality “requires that the prediction be tested, and then the 
models adjusted based on the results.”106 However, Alaska’s existing 
permitting scheme already addresses this issue. According to Tom 
Crafford, Director of the Large Mine Team within DNR, Alaska agencies 
diligently review reports from approved mine monitoring programs.107 
Responding to the Kuipers Report’s conclusion that regulators do not 
compare actual results with predictions, Crafford counters that Alaska 
“regulators modify terms of mining permits on an ongoing basis in 
response to problems detected and violations of water quality 
 
 103. JAMES R. KUIPERS ET AL., COMPARISON OF PREDICTED AND ACTUAL WATER 
QUALITY AT HARDROCK MINES: THE RELIABILITY OF PREDICTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENTS ES-1 (2006). 
 104. Parker, supra note 1, at 21–31. 
 105. KUIPERS, supra note 103, at 87 (emphasis added). 
 106. ALAN SEPTOFF, PREDICTING WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS AT HARDROCK 
MINES: A FAILURE OF SCIENCE, OVERSIGHT, AND GOOD PRACTICE, at 2 (Dec. 2006) 
(Earthworks Whitepaper summarizing Kuipers Report), http:// 
hwww.earthworksaction.org/pubs/PredictionsComparisonsWhitePaperFINAL.
pdf. 
 107. Ragsdale, supra note 102. 
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standards,” and that DNR, DEC and ADF&G pay close attention to 
predictions versus outcomes as well as differences between the two.108 
The Kuipers Report does not mention Alaska’s monitoring 
requirements because it does not even address the state’s mining or 
environmental laws. Rather, it critiques the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) process under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), a federal law applicable to federal agencies undertaking 
permitting actions under federal programs.109 The Kuipers Report found 
that the environmental impact statements reviewed by the authors 
understated mining risks, leading agency decision makers to either 
grant permits that should have been denied or authorize mining projects 
with permits that did not include sufficient environmental 
protections.110 The Kuipers Report encourages agencies to be more 
aggressive in their substantive application of the EIS process as a tool for 
decision making, without suggesting changes to the EIS process. 
One example illustrates this point: Kuipers argues that permitting 
decisions by federal agencies should be based on an evaluation of 
“potential” (i.e., worst case scenario) environmental impacts rather than 
“predicted” (i.e., most likely scenario) environmental impacts.111 NEPA 
already requires an agency to include an analysis of catastrophic 
impacts in the EIS—even if their probability is low—provided that the 
analysis is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on 
pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason.”112 This rule is not an 
empty requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recently rejected an argument by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) that the risk of a terrorist attack on a spent fuel 
storage installation was “speculative and simply too far removed from 
the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require a study 
under NEPA.”113 The court found that the NRC’s refusal to consider the 
environmental effects of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility was 
unreasonable since precise quantification of some stated level of risk 
was not necessary to trigger NEPA requirements, and because it was 
possible to conduct a low probability, high consequence analysis.114 
Under current law, risk judgments are appropriately committed to 
an agency’s discretion. In one case, the likelihood of the “predicted” 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
 110. KUIPERS, supra note 103, at 193–94. 
 111. See id. at 84. 
 112. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (2008). 
 113. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n., 449 
F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 114. Id. at 1031. 
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scenario might be 99.7% and the likelihood of the “potential” scenario 
might be 0.0004%; in another case, the likelihood of the “predicted” 
scenario might be only 55%, while the likelihood of the worst case 
scenario is 25%. It makes no sense to require an agency to base its 
decision on the worst case scenario in both instances. Similarly, the 
degree to which the adverse environmental consequences under the 
worst case scenario exceed those under the predicted scenario will differ 
radically from one project to the next. This variability makes it unwise, 
and likely impossible, to legislate a one-size-fits-all statutory 
requirement addressing the relationship between the “predicted” 
scenario and the “potential” scenario in preparing an EIS or in making 
any discretionary regulatory decision. The important thing is that 
alternative possible outcomes must be identified and accurately assessed 
in the EIS so that the federal agency decision makers are able to take a 
hard look at the issues and make an informed decision.115 That is what 
NEPA requires.116 The Authors are unaware of any legal scholar 
advocating amendment of NEPA to codify a rule that the decision must 
in each and every case be predicated on the worst case scenario.117 
D. Alaska’s Current Comprehensive, Detailed, and Substantively 
Stringent Regulatory Regime 
We turn now to the heart of the Parker article, the argument that 
Alaska’s state natural resource and environmental laws do not protect 
fisheries resources. Before discussing each of the current laws that 
Parker critiqued, we make three preliminary observations. 
First, as noted above, the laws governing the acquisition of 
property interests in public natural resources—minerals, water, use of 
the surface of public lands—are not the only laws, nor even the principle 
laws, that the state and federal governments use to protect the 
 
 115. Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 116. Id. 
 117. NEPA regulations mandated worst-case analysis until 1986, when CEQ 
replaced the former 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22—which required an agency to include in 
the EIS a “worst-case analysis and an indication of the probability or 
improbability of its occurrence” when relevant information was either 
unavailable or too costly to obtain—with the current version of the regulation, 
requiring an agency to deal with uncertainties by including within the EIS “a 
summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating 
the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts [and] . . . the agency's 
evaluation of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research 
methods generally accepted in the scientific community.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 
1502.22(b)(3)–(4). The Supreme Court has held that the amendment of the 
regulations nullified the worst-case analysis requirement. Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989). 
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environment.118 Assessing the environmental regulation of a large 
Alaska mining project without considering all of the applicable 
environmental laws is misleading and will inevitably lead to a wrong 
conclusion. 
Second, in the context of public natural resource development, it is 
problematic to judge a specific law’s adequacy in isolation. A public 
natural resource development project of any size or complexity will 
implicate many permit requirements and environmental regulations. 
The entire matrix of leases, permits, statutes and regulations provide 
comprehensive environmental protection. One should not assess a single 
permit or authorization in isolation and criticize it for not doing the 
entire job.119  
Third, there is a temporal element to this discussion: laws change. 
Though a forty-year project might receive all of the permits it needs 
before development begins, its comprehensive permitting status will not 
excuse it from compliance with present or future environmental laws. 
As time passes and scientific and technical knowledge improve, laws 
change too. For example, a mining project initiated twenty or more years 
ago, like Greens Creek in Southeast Alaska or Fort Knox near Fairbanks, 
is subject to numerous environmental laws that did not exist when the 
project was originally permitted and developed.120 
Another facet of the temporal element is the five-year 
environmental compliance audit required by DNR or DEC as part of the 
reissuance of permits.121 These audits supplement periodic on-site 
inspections by state and federal agencies. Through audits and 
 
 118. See supra Part VI.A. 
 119. For example (as discussed in more detail in this Part), without any 
reference whatsoever to the state’s instream flow reservation requirements, 
Parker concludes that the statutory criteria for issuing a permit to appropriate 
water are insufficient to protect fish and game resources (even though the 
reservation requirements and criteria appear in the same statute). Parker, supra 
note 1, at 26. Similarly, Parker complains that DNR has unacceptably wide 
latitude to determine “necessary” mining-related surface uses of land and water 
because the applicable statute limiting allowable surface uses does not define the 
term “necessary.” Id. at 25. However, Parker ignores the accompanying 
regulations, which specify the factors DNR must use to determine “necessary” 
surface structures and improvements for authorized operations. ALASKA ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 11, § 86.145(a)(2) (2008). 
 120. In this Article, we do not address the constitutional issues concerning the 
application of later-enacted laws to previously-permitted projects, such as 
impairment of contracts or takings issues. 
 121. Ed Fogels, The Process and Requirements for Large Mine Permit 
Applications in Alaska (Alaska Dep’t of Natural Res. Office of Project Mgmt. 
and Permitting) (Jan. 2008) (stating, in slide entitled Environmental Audits, that 
audits on 5-year schedule are tied to reissuance of permits) (PowerPoint 
materials on file with author). 
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inspections and the periodic reporting required by permits, a mine 
receives constant oversight. 
1.  State Oversight of Large Scale Mines 
Oversight of large-scale mines by the State of Alaska focuses both 
on an Integrated Waste Management Permit issued by DEC122 and the 
review and approval of a proposed Plan of Operations and Reclamation 
by DNR.123 State agencies must undertake these permitting reviews even 
for projects on federal land that are authorized by the federal 
government.124 
 The DEC’s Integrated Waste Management Permit manages tailings 
and waste rock from large mine operations by consolidating state 
permitting requirements for solid waste management, water quality 
standards, and wastewater disposal.125 Focusing primarily on surface 
and groundwater concerns, the integrated permit is designed to: control 
potential contaminants from acid rock drainage, metal leaching, and 
process chemicals; regulate wastewater from disposal and processing 
operations; and manage garbage and any sewage sludge disposal 
associated with camp facilities.126 In drafting an Integrated Waste 
Management Permit, DEC reviews a multitude of other applications 
submitted to state agencies for other authorizations, including the plan 
of operations, monitoring plan, closure plan, waste characterization 
plan, design and construction documents, and financial assurance 
instruments.127 Specific applications are reviewed by DEC or DNR, 
enabling each agency to provide input from its own unique perspectives 
and areas of responsibility.128 
 
 122. Section 46.03.100(d) of the Alaska Statutes authorizes DEC to issue: 
an integrated waste management and disposal authorization covering multiple 
related or unrelated waste management or disposal activities to be conducted at 
a facility, including generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of solid or 
liquid waste. An integrated waste management and disposal authorization may 
include the authorizations in (b) and (c) of this section and a water-quality-
related certification required by 33 U.S.C. § 1341 for the discharge of dredged or 
fill materials or of pollutants to surface waters from point sources. 
ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.100(d) (2008). 
 123. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.030 (2008). 
 124. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.010(b) (2008). 
 125. Fogels, supra note 121. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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2. Limitations Imposed on Surface Use Rights of Mineral Estate 
Interest Owners 
The underlying purpose of section 38.05.255 of the Alaska 
Statutes is to restrict the rights that an owner of an interest in a mineral 
estate on Alaska state lands may exercise on the surface of the land. This 
section implements the multiple use requirements of the Alaska 
Constitution and largely negates the common law rule describing the 
mineral owner’s dominant estate. The Parker article’s discussion of this 
statute overlooks the principal purpose and consequence of this statute. 
The principle of limited surface use in the mineral development 
context appears not only in statute, but is also explicitly mandated by 
the Alaska Constitution. The constitution states, “Surface uses of land by 
a mineral claimant shall be limited to those necessary for the extraction 
or basic processing of the mineral deposits, or for both.”129 To 
implement this constitutional requirement, the Alaska Statutes limit 
surface uses of land or water within a mining property to those 
necessary for prospecting for, extracting, or processing minerals, and 
subjects those uses to reasonable concurrent uses.130 In contrast, federal 
laws and laws in other public land states generally recognize much 
broader surface rights for mineral resource owners. For example, federal 
mining law provides that owners of federal mining claims “shall have 
the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface 
included within the lines of their locations.”131 Likewise, the common 
law rule of mineral estate dominance is not applicable to lands owned 
by or devolving from the State of Alaska, since the State is required by 
statute to reserve certain mineral rights when it conveys title to an 
interest in its lands.132 As a result, the title to most land in Alaska is 
subject to a mineral estate reservation or else is a “split estate,” with 
separate parties owning the surface estate and the mineral estate. Alaska 
law and U.S. law are inverse—U.S. law limits the rights of others to 
what is “necessary” and otherwise leaves control of the surface to the 
owner; Alaska law leaves control of the surface to the state, except 
where “necessary” for the miner. 
Property lawyers in most jurisdictions would probably view 
section 38.05.255 of the Alaska Statutes as a radical affront to the mining 
 
 129. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 11. 
 130. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.255(a) (2008). 
 131. 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2006); see also 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) (2006) (making 
unpatented federal mining claims “subject . . . to the right of the United States, 
its permittees, and licensees, to use so much of the surface thereof as may be 
necessary for [non-mining surface use] purposes or for access to adjacent land”). 
 132. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.125 (2008); Parker v. Alaska Power Auth., 913 P.2d 
1089, 1090 (Alaska 1996). 
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industry. It flatly prohibits surface use by the mineral developer absent a 
showing of necessity.133 Moreover, the statute prohibits certain activities, 
even those shown to be “necessary,” if they would prevent “reasonable 
concurrent uses.”134 Furthermore, rather than leaving judgments about 
necessity and reasonableness to the courts, section 38.05.255 of the 
Alaska Statutes, by specifying that surface uses within a mining 
property are restricted to those approved by DNR, endows DNR with 
the power to make the decisions.135 
The Parker article asserts that the Alaska Legislature, rather than 
DNR, should define the word “necessary.”136 It asserts that existing law 
affords DNR “no basis” to make basic decisions about, for example, 
something as common as employee housing at a remote mining camp.137 
In fact, DNR’s determination of “necessary” uses is guided by regulation 
and formalized in written authorization. On state-owned lands, the 
placement of surface structures and improvements must be approved 
through a plan of operations, a land use permit, or some other written 
authorization.138 DNR’s surface use determinations are required by 
regulation to consider “access to the mining property, remoteness of 
location, security of the operations, planned level of operations, existing 
authorized surface uses, and the current level of activity.”139 In making 
its determination to grant surface use approvals, DNR is not limited to a 
mineral owner’s assertions of necessity, but has the authority to require 
evidence about the proposed mining activity to support a request for 
surface use.140 
Moreover, where the written surface use authorization takes the 
form of a “plan of operations,” the plan itself must specify, among other 
things, “the actions to be taken to avoid or minimize detrimental effects 
on fish and wildlife and their habitats.”141 The decision to approve a 
plan of operations is not within DNR’s sole discretion; it must first 
consult with the Department of Fish and Game, DEC, and other affected 
agencies.142 This requirement ensures that concerns such as subsistence 
use impacts and water quality are integrated into the mine permitting 
 
 133. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.255(a) (2008). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Parker, supra note 1, at 25. 
 137. Id. 
 138. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.145(a)(2) (2008). 
 139. Id. 
 140. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.145(a)(4) (2008). 
 141. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.800(b)(9) (2008). 
 142. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.800(e) (2008). 
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process, not only as stand-alone considerations governed by their own 
specific statutes, but also as part of mine design and operation.143 
Thus, the existing surface use laws imposed by Alaska’s 
constitution, statutes, and regulations provide DNR with the necessary 
and proper direction required to make correct decisions and the 
comprehensive legal authority to enforce them. 
3. DNR Authority to Grant Temporary Surface Use Rights 
Section 38.05.850 of the Alaska Statutes grants DNR the broad 
authority to issue (and revoke) “permits, rights-of-way, or easements on 
state land for . . . uses or improvements [such as roads, pipelines, and 
transmission lines].”144 In so doing, DNR is required to “give preference 
to that use of the land that will be of greatest economic benefit to the 
state and the development of its resources.”145 The Parker article asserts 
that this and other land use statutes lack specificity146 and complains 
that the law does not “spell out” the factors DNR should consider in 
determining the greatest economic benefit to Alaska and does not clarify 
what is meant by “the state.”147 However, consistent with the plain 
language of the statute, the Alaska Supreme Court found nothing 
objectionable about the generality by which the statute authorized DNR 
to exercise its authority, observing simply that “[i]n the absence of any 
showing of disregard of [giving preference to the use of the land which 
will be of greatest economic benefit to the state and the development of 
its resources], we will not assume the [DNR] acted improperly.”148 
The statute provides clear criteria for DNR to apply in making its 
surface use permitting decisions, and the Alaska Supreme Court has 
shown it trusts DNR to implement the unambiguous terms of the 
statute. The statute means what it says. There is no confusion about it 
and no justification for any change in the law. 
4. DNR Regulation of Water Use 
Section 46.15.080 of the Alaska Statutes, a provision of Alaska’s 
Water Use Act, lists the factors that DNR must consider when 
determining whether a proposed water appropriation is in the public 
interest, including “the effect on fish and game resources and on public 
 
 143. See id. (requiring the plan be ”submitted to the Department at least 50 
days before operations . . . begin”). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Parker, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
 147. Id. at 26. 
 148. Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 295 n.12 (Alaska 1972). 
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recreational opportunities.”149 Other sections of the Alaska Water Use 
Act provide additional protections for Alaska’s fish and game resources. 
Alaska’s natural waters are reserved to the people for common use 
and are subject to reservation of in-stream flows of water.150 
Accordingly, DNR is required to reserve water in lakes and streams and 
to maintain fish habitat whenever a person seeks to remove a significant 
quantity of water from a lake or stream used by fish for spawning, 
incubation, rearing, or migration.151 Such a reservation is withdrawn 
from future appropriation, thereby ensuring that the body of water will 
benefit fish and their habitat as long as it remains in effect.152 Even 
proposed appropriations of five thousand gallons or less per day—
normally exempt from the reservation requirement—will trigger a 
reservation if DNR determines, in consultation with the Department of 
Fish and Game, that the appropriation may adversely affect fish 
habitat.153 
In any case, when DNR issues a permit to allow a person to 
appropriate water, it may impose conditions necessary to protect the 
public interest, including conditions restricting water withdrawals to 
protect fish or wildlife habitat or for recreational purposes.154 Moreover, 
Alaska’s Water Use Act allows the State, its political subdivisions, and 
individuals to apply for in-stream flow reservations for, among other 
things, the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, and park 
purposes.155 
The permit criteria imposed by section 46.15.080 of the Alaska 
Statutes provide the basis for challenging a decision by DNR to grant 
water rights. Before DNR authorizes any use of water, it must determine 
that there will always be enough water left in the stream to avoid 
impacts to resources or habitat.156 Subsistence fishery users have 
successfully used the statute to challenge the issuance of permits 
without conditions protective of fish and game resources.157 A reviewing 
court must evaluate  “whether [DNR’s] decision was based on a 
 
 149. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(b)(3) (2008). 
 150. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (2008); see also ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 13 
(“Except for public water supply, an appropriation of water shall be . . . subject 
to . . . the general reservation of fish and wildlife.”). 
 151. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035(c) (2008). 
 152. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035(c)(1) (2008). 
 153. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035(c)(5) (2008). 
 154. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 93.120(e)(3) (2008). 
 155. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145(a) (2008). 
 156. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2008). 
 157. See, e.g., Tulkisarmute Native Cmty. v. Heinze, 898 P.2d 935 (Alaska 
1995). 
REEVES_FINAL.DOC 5/4/2009  2:45:21 PM 
28 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
consideration of the relevant factors.”158 The courts view the listed 
“relevant factors” in section 46.15.080 of the Alaska Statutes as essential 
to DNR’s determination of whether a water right is in the public interest 
and will find an abuse of discretion where, for instance, DNR does not 
adequately address fish and wildlife concerns.159 
This review is not perfunctory, as the Parker article implies. The 
Alaska Supreme Court found an abuse of discretion in a case in which 
DNR decided to extend permits to appropriate water from the Tuluksak 
River and its tributaries for placer gold mining without sufficient 
conditions to protect fish and wildlife.160 The Tuluksak River was 
characterized as a major contributor to the Kuskokwim River 
commercial fishery and described to contain “the highest quality king 
salmon spawning habitat in the Tuluksak River drainage.”161 Local 
native groups argued that DNR failed to address their subsistence and 
commercial fishery concerns adequately when it included only a very 
general condition to protect fish and wildlife in its extended permits.162 
The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, finding that (1) the permits’ sole 
condition was too vague to protect the salmon habitat from dewatering 
due to mining, and (2) DNR abused its discretion by failing to impose 
stringent limitations on dewatering to protect fish habitat.163 
5. DNR Regulation of Dams, Including Tailings Impoundments 
The Parker article views Alaska’s dam construction statute in 
isolation, concluding that it does not directly address fish, game or 
habitat considerations.164 That statement is not only incorrect, it also 
disregards the limited purpose of the dam construction statute and 
implies that it is, or should be, a tool for broad environmental 
regulation.  This statute and its regulations focus on the design, 
operation, and maintenance of dam structures.165 However, dam 
construction is likely to implicate both the Fishway Act and the 
 
 158. Id. at 940. 
 159. Id. at 950. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 938 n.2. 
 162. Id. at 952 (“DNR’s decision granting the permit extensions contained one 
condition regarding fish and wildlife: ‘Operations will be conducted in a manner 
to minimize wildlife species disruption and habitat destruction. Reclamation 
will be designed, to the extent practicable, to enhance wildlife habitat diversity 
and productivity.’”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Parker, supra note 1, at 26. 
 165. ALASKA STAT. § 46.17 (2008); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 93.150–93.201 
(2008). 
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Anadromous Fish Act.166 Furthermore, such construction could require 
analysis, for example, under section 38.05.255 of the Alaska Statutes, 
which governs surface uses of state land (including tailings disposal), as 
well as under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which governs permits 
for fill material deposited during tailings impoundment construction.167 
Both of these statutes protect fish, game, and habitat. Similarly, Alaska 
mining regulations require an approved plan of operations for mining 
on state land where a lease is not required to mine, such as the lands 
where Pebble’s claims are located.168 As noted previously in this article, 
an approved plan of operations must include, inter alia, “actions to be 
taken to avoid or minimize detrimental effects on fish and wildlife and 
their habitats.”169 
Alaska law requires that dams be inspected at least every five 
years.170 No dam can be enlarged, repaired, altered, removed, 
maintained, operated, or abandoned without approval of DNR.171 A 
mine that ceases to operate must comply with these requirements for 
any dam associated with its prior operations.172 Dam reclamation is a 
part of a mine’s reclamation plan. Furthermore, Alaska law requires a 
mine operator to provide funding for dam maintenance and long-term 
waste management for as long as the dam remains in place.173 
Additionally, construction of a dam on wetlands triggers the 
federal Clean Water Act.  This statute requires the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) to comply with criteria known as the “Section 
404(b)(1) Guidelines” (“Guidelines”) before any discharge of dredged or 
fill material into wetlands is authorized.174  This includes authorization 
to begin construction of a tailings dam. The Guidelines prescribe a three-
part requirement: first, avoid wetlands; second, minimize loss of 
wetlands; third, mitigate loss of wetlands.175  Under this requirement, 
USACE will not grant a Section 404 permit if there is a practicable 
 
 166. ALASKA STAT. § 41.14.870 (2008). The Anadromous Fish Act requires that 
an individual or government agency provide prior notification and obtain 
approval from DNR to construct a hydraulic project or use, divert, obstruct, 
pollute or change the natural flow or bed of a specified anadromous water body. 
 167. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 et. seq. (2006). 
 168. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.800(a) (2008) (“An approved plan of 
operations takes the place of the land use permit or miscellaneous land use 
permit that would be required under this title for unleased land.”). 
 169. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 86.800(b)(9) (2008). 
 170. ALASKA STAT. § 46.17.050 (2008). 
 171. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.17.040(a), 46.17.900(3) (2008). 
 172. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.17.040(a), 46.17.900(6) (2008). 
 173. ALASKA STAT. §§ 37.14.800, 37.14.820, 27.19.040 (2008). 
 174. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (2008). 
 175. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.5 (2008). 
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alternative that would have a lower environmental impact.176 Further, 
USACE will deny a Section 404 permit unless the applicant has taken 
“appropriate and practicable steps . . . [to] minimize potential adverse 
impacts of the [proposed] discharge on the aquatic ecosystem.”177 As 
part of an EIS to evaluate a tailings dam at a large mine site, USACE will 
study whether the project proponent avoided wetland impacts where 
practicable, minimized potential impacts to wetlands, and provided 
compensation for unavoidable impacts by funding activities to restore or 
create wetlands.178 
The Guidelines also prohibit discharges that would cause or 
contribute to violations of state water quality standards, including those 
for copper and other total dissolved solids (TDS).179 The Clean Water 
Act requires Alaska to certify that the discharges authorized by the 
permit comply with water quality standards.180 
Additionally, the Clean Water Act requires Alaska to review its 
water quality standards every three years (the “Triennial Review”) in 
order to make revisions that are necessary to integrate the latest science, 
technology, and federal legal requirements into the standards.181 
Accordingly, the DEC is working to update its “Toxics Manual,”182  
based on recent scientific literature.183 For example, DEC is planning to 
review fish consumption rates in Alaska as part of the Triennial Review 
to evaluate whether its human health criteria for fish consumption are 
 
 176. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2008). An alternative is “practicable” if it “is 
available and capable of being done after considering cost, existing technology, 
and logistics in light of overall project purposes.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2) (2008). 
 177. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2008). 
 178. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (2008). 
 179. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(1) (2008). 
 180. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 181. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006). The Parker article recommends that new 
scientific findings and synergistic effects of dissolved metals, particularly 
copper, be considered “in devising state statutory standards.” Parker et al., supra 
note 1, at 21. However, the current water quality standard for copper already 
prohibits “concentrations of toxic substances in water or in shoreline or bottom 
sediments, that, singly or in combination, cause, or reasonably can be expected 
to cause, adverse effects on aquatic life . . . .” ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 
70.020(b)(11)(C) (2008). 
 182. ALASKA, DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, ALASKA WATER QUALITY 
CRITERIA MANUAL FOR TOXIC AND OTHER DELETERIOUS ORGANIC AND INORGANIC 
SUBSTANCES (May 15, 2003), http://www.dec.state.ak.us/water/wqsar/wqs/ 
pdfs/70wqsmanual.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2009). 
 183. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DISSOLVED INORGANIC 
SUBSTANCES – TDS FACT SHEET, http://dec.alaska.gov/ water/wqsar/trireview/ 
pdfs/Dissolved%20Inorganic%20Substances%20-%20TDS%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2009). 
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sufficiently protective.184 Not only do Alaska’s water quality standards 
come into play during the Section 404 permitting process, compliance 
with the standards is also required for any discharges permitted under 
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).185 This is 
but one example of the interplay between the various processes required 
to permit a large mine in Alaska. 
The Guidelines prohibit discharges that would cause or contribute 
to “significant degradation” of United States waters, defined to include 
adverse effects on fish, wildlife, and habitat.186 To evaluate the potential 
environmental impact of a proposed discharge, USACE must make 
various factual determinations, including the effect that a discharge will 
have on the structure and function of the aquatic ecosystem and its 
organisms.187 The factual determinations extend to evaluating the 
collective effect of numerous individual discharges as well as the 
secondary effects of discharges on aquatic ecosystems.188 Given these 
considerations, it is clear that the permitting requirements for dam 
construction must take into account fish, game, and their habitat, along 
with requirements for dam integrity. “Fish, game, habitat and uses of 
these resources” are not “ignored” during dam authorization, as Parker 
asserts.189 
The Parker article also observes that more than fifty percent of the 
streams, rivers and lakes in Alaska used by anadromous fish remain to 
be identified190 in Alaska’s “Catalog of Waters Important for the 
Spawning, Rearing or Migration of Anadromous Fishes” and its 
associated atlas (the “Catalog”).191 ADF&G recognizes that many 
remote, small, or ephemeral anadromous systems have not been 
surveyed and are not included.192 Alaska law authorizes the public to 
nominate additional anadromous water bodies or streams for inclusion 
in (or deletion from) the Catalog.193 No fish habitat, anadromous or 
otherwise, may be obstructed without ADF&G authorization, regardless 
 
 184. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, TOXICS FACT SHEET, 
http://www.dec.state.ak.us/ 
water/wqsar/trireview/pdfs/Toxics%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 
2009). 
 185. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 186. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2008). 
 187. Id. 
 188. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(h) (2008). 
 189. See Parker et al., supra note 1, at 26. 
 190. See id. at 29. 
 191. STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, ANADROMOUS WATERS CATALOG 
– INTRODUCTION, http://www.sf.adfg.state.ak.us/SARR/AWC/index.cfm/FA/ 
intro.guide (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
 192. Id. 
 193. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 95.011 (Jan. 2009 Supp.). 
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of whether it is listed in the Catalog.194 Such authorization often includes 
stipulations to facilitate and protect fishways, related to the design of 
intake structures, culverts and bridges, as well as sedimentation 
control.195  
It is also important to note that permit applications related to dam 
construction require pre-development baseline environmental 
monitoring as well as additional ongoing monitoring during project 
development and operation. The data provide fundamental, detailed 
information on the fisheries resources near a proposed project and 
supplement any general information developed by ADF&G. 
VI.   ALASKA’S LAWS PROVIDE ASSURANCE OF MINE SITE 
RECLAMATION 
In addition to being subject to the numerous federal and state 
environmental statutes and regulations that will govern its operations, 
the Pebble Project will also be subject to strict state reclamation 
standards after operations cease. Mine operators must submit a detailed 
“reclamation plan” to DNR for review and approval prior to 
commencing any mining operation in the state.196  During the life of the 
mine, operations in Alaska must be conducted in a manner that prevents 
“unnecessary and undue degradation of land and water resources,” and 
the land where an operation is conducted must be reclaimed to leave the 
mine site in a “stable condition.”197 
Following cessation of operations, all mine sites must be returned 
to a condition compatible with the Commissioner’s post-mining land 
use.198 
A. Alaska’s Statutory Reclamation Bonding Mandate 
To ensure that reclamation plans are implemented and a mine site 
is properly restored, a mine operator must provide financial assurance 
to cover the cost of reclamation.199 Both DNR and DEC must approve 
this reclamation bond.200 Bond amounts for large mines in Alaska 
 
 194. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.841 (2008) (allowing the commissioner to require a 
fishway if he finds it necessary). 
 195. Id. 
 196. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.030 (2008). 
 197. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.020 (2008). 
 198. Id. 
 199. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.040 (2008); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.400 
(2008). 
 200. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.040 (2008); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.400 
(2008). 
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currently range from $3.5 million for the relatively small Nixon Fork 
gold mine to $154.9 million for the much larger Red Dog zinc mine.201 
The mining bond amount is reviewed either when significant changes 
are made in mining operations or every five years, whichever occurs 
first.202 Separate statutes provide that the operator must also prove to the 
DEC that it has the financial ability to “close” the mining waste disposal 
facility and prevent pollution.203 
B. Alaska’s Substantive Hard Rock Mine Reclamation Requirements 
State mining regulations closely control the reclamation process, 
from the initial approval of a reclamation plan, to reclamation bonding 
and enforcement of reclamation requirements during operations and 
after mining ceases.204 
Every major mining project operates according to a comprehensive 
reclamation plan.  The mine operator must submit the proposed 
reclamation plan to DNR at forty-five days before mine operations 
begin.205  The detailed reclamation plan requires, among other 
requirements, a discussion of specific measures the mine operator will 
take to protect environmental resources and restore the mine site after 
closure.  These  measures must include plans for: managing topsoil 
removal, storage, protection and replacement; reclamation of tailings 
impoundments and settling ponds; stream placement and reclamation; 
and reclamation or post-mining conversion of access roads or 
airstrips.206 The mine operator faces penalties (including stoppage of the 
mining operation) throughout the life of a mining operation if the 
operator does not file annual reports that include total acreage and 
volume of material mined each year.207 
The reclamation plan is subject to annual review and evaluation by 
DNR to ensure that the approved reclamation plan is on schedule; if 
DNR is not satisfied, DNR has the authority to approve the plan “only 
after inclusion of reclamation-specific monitoring, reporting, or 
performance conditions.”208 The mine operator must also allow DNR 
 
 201. Fogels, supra note 99. 
 202. Id. 
 203. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.100(f) (2008). 
 204. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.100(a) (2008). 
 205. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.300 (2008). 
 206. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.310(b)(6) (2008). 
 207. ALASKA ADMIN CODE tit. 11, § 97.320(a) (2008). 
 208. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.320 (2008). 
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personnel into the mine for purposes of inspecting or monitoring 
compliance with the reclamation plan.209 
Substantive administrative mine reclamation requirements are 
extensive.  For instance, re-vegetation must normally be completed 
within five years after reclamation.210 There are also compulsory 
grading, backfilling, and contouring standards designed to reclaim the 
land and restore it to a pre-mining condition.211 All structures, 
equipment, debris, and other features of the mining operation must be 
permanently removed unless the DNR land manager allows them to 
stay. 212 Significantly, the regulations require that a “miner shall reclaim 
a mined area that has potential to generate acid rock drainage (acid mine 
drainage) in a manner that prevents the generation of acid rock drainage 
or prevents the offsite discharge of acid rock drainage.”213 
C. Statutory and Regulatory Penalties for Reclamation Plan 
Violations 
Mine operators who violate the above statutes and regulations are 
subject to a host of potentially serious punishments.  A mine operator 
who violates or permits a violation of a DNR-approved reclamation 
plan, and then fails to comply with an administrative order to cure the 
violation, forfeits the posted reclamation bond or a portion thereof, and 
is also liable to the state for the full amount of reclamation and 
administrative costs associated with bringing the action.214 In addition, 
DNR may suspend or even revoke mining permits for operations not in 
compliance with approved reclamation plans and deny future permits 
for the same.215 
VII.  PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON PEBBLE AND ALASKA TAKINGS 
LAW 
Whether or not the proposed regulations aimed at stopping the 
development of Pebble Mine, discussed either in the Parker article or 
proposed sometime in the future, will be considered a compensable 
taking is an open question under Alaska law. However, an analysis of 
the Alaska takings law shows that Alaska provides significantly broader 
 
 209. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.340(b) (2008). 
 210. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.200(a)(1) (2008). 
 211. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.200(b) (2008). 
 212. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.210 (2008). 
 213. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 97.240 (2008). 
 214. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.070(a) (2008). 
 215. ALASKA STAT. § 27.19.070(b) (2008). 
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protection to property owners than the federal constitution. Therefore, it 
is at least likely that regulations such as House Bill 134 will result in a 
taking of private property. 
A. Background Law 
First, the Alaska Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, forbids the 
government from taking private property, even for public use, unless it 
pays “just compensation.”216 However, the provisions in the Alaska 
Constitution which prohibit a “taking” without just compensation offer 
more protections to property interests than do their federal 
counterparts.217 This facial analysis is supported by the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s broad interpretation of the takings clause in the state 
constitution.218 
With respect to takings clauses, Alaska courts have determined that 
the textual differences between the federal and Alaska constitutions are 
material and substantial; federal takings jurisprudence therefore 
provides limited guidance to the Alaska courts on how to resolve 
takings claims.219 
The Alaska Constitution states that “[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”220 Unlike 
the federal takings clause, this section covers both takings and damage 
to property interests. Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court has 
interpreted section 18 of the Alaska Constitution to provide property 
owners with broader protection than the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.221 The court has interpreted the Alaska 
takings clause liberally in favor of property owners.222 
Next, the Alaska Constitution specifically addresses takings of 
interests in natural resources by referring to interests in lands in article 
VIII, section 16: 
 
 216. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18 and art. VIII, § 16 with U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Spinell Homes v. Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P. 3d 692, 702 
(Alaska 2003); R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 293 (Alaska 
2001); Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993). 
 219. Thomas V. Van Flein, The Baker Doctrine and the New Federalism: 
Developing Independent Constitutional Principles Under the Alaska Constitution, 21 
ALASKA L. REV. 227, 255 (2004). 
 220. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18. 
 221. Spinell Homes, 78 P. 3d at 702; R & Y, Inc., 34 P.3d at 293; Sandberg, 861 
P.2d at 557. 
 222. Ehrlander v. State, Dep’t. of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 797 P.2d 629, 633 
(Alaska 1990). 
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No person shall be involuntarily divested of his right to the use 
of waters, his interests in lands, or improvements affecting 
either, except for a superior beneficial use or public purpose 
and then only with just compensation and by operation of 
law.223 
In Wernberg v. State,224 the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a 
person whose property access was impaired by the construction of a 
new state road was entitled to just compensation under article VIII, 
section 16 of the Alaska Constitution. In reaching this result, the 
Wernberg court relied on excerpts from the State’s constitutional 
convention: 
The constitutional minutes reflect the following discussion 
concerning a proposed amendment to the original language of 
article VIII, section 16: 
The section that I’m proposing to amend. . . speaks of “No 
person shall be involuntarily divested of his right to use of 
waters, his interest in lands, or improvements affecting either, 
except for a superior beneficial or public use and then only by 
operation of law.” And it is most pointed that you haven’t 
made any reference to eminent domain. Now, Mr. Riley told 
me that he thought “operation of law” embodied the thought of 
eminent domain and would probably be the type of 
proceedings used and that would carry just compensation. But, 
just to be sure, and for clarity’s sake, I ask that, following the 
word “law” we say “with just compensation.”225 
Delegate Riley provided further explanation which led to the 
adoption of the amendment: 
Well, assume, Mr. Gray, that you have appropriated water for a 
specific purpose, and thereafter, another sought to use the same 
waters for a use or purpose considered to be of a superior or 
higher public purpose; although your appropriation would be 
better in time, he could institute condemnation proceedings 
and prevail over you by virtue of his higher public purpose to 
be served by that water, perhaps a public or municipal water 
supply.226 
 
 223. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 16. 
 224. 516 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1973). 
 225. Id. at 1199 (quoting 4 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings 
2562 (1955)). 
 226. Id. (quoting 4 Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings 2563 
(1955)). 
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This discussion is readily analogous to a situation where the Pebble 
mining claims are preempted for the “higher public purpose” of creating 
a game refuge or to benefit marine fisheries. Consequently, article VIII, 
section 16 would likely be read to encompass the Pebble claims in the 
event that beneficial use cannot be made of them as a result of state 
action. 
Therefore, Alaska law gives persons holding mining claims the 
right to mine their interests in most instances. According to the Alaska 
Supreme Court, the “traditional” takings doctrine in article I, section 18 
is only implicated when the State deprives a person of a property 
right.227 Regardless of whether a mining claim constitutes a property 
right, it constitutes an “interest in lands” within the meaning of article 
VIII, section 16. 
Property interests in Alaska are “created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from . . . state 
law.”228 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,229 a case which involved a 
takings claim, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
“property” extends beyond land and tangible goods to intangible 
interests created under state law.230 In Alaska, mining claims are among 
the property rights susceptible to a “taking” as recognized by the Court 
in Ruckelshaus. Thus, any suggestion that a mining claim carries with it 
no right to mine is incorrect and reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Alaska mining law. 
Alaska law specifies that a person obtains exclusive rights to 
possess and extract minerals on state land open to claim staking by 
discovery, location, and recording.231 “In most areas, such a location is a 
‘mining claim,’ which gives the owner an immediate property right to 
mine the deposits.”232 
Locations that give rise to an immediate property right to mine are 
distinguished from locations made on state lands that may be mined 
only under lease.233 A location made on land restricted to leasing is 
known as a “leasehold location,” not a mining claim. A leasehold 
 
 227. Beluga Mining Co. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 973 P.2d 570, 575 
(Alaska 1999). 
 228. Anderson v. State ex rel. Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 
710, 715 (Alaska 2003) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 
(1984)). 
 229. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 230. Id. at 1003. 
 231. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.195 (2008); Welcome v. Jennings, 780 P.2d 1039, 
1042 (Alaska 1989). 
 232. ALASKA DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., FACT SHEET: UPLAND MINING LEASEHOLD 
LOCATION 1 (Aug. 2006) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ADNR Fact Sheet]. 
 233. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.185(a) (2008). 
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location must be converted to an upland mining lease before mining 
begins.234 In unrestricted areas, locators may convert their mining claims 
to leases if they wish but are not required to do so before mining 
commences.235 Thus, under Alaska law a mining claim includes a right 
to mine. In Alaska, as on federally owned property, “[a] validly located 
mining claim is, in the truest sense, an interest in real property.”236 
Moreover, a claim is also a protected “interest in lands” under article 
VIII, section 16. Thus, the state must provide just compensation if the 
interest is taken. 
Finally, an important factor to consider when analyzing whether 
mining rights are constitutionally protected from a governmental taking 
without just compensation is the nature of the reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the party seeking protection.237 
A person’s reasonable expectations are controlled by the law in 
effect when the interest is acquired. In the case of the Pebble claims, the 
law in effect when the claims were staked created an expectation that the 
claims could be developed to extract mineral resources. In addition to 
the provisions of sections 38.05.185–275 of the Alaska Statutes, DNR 
Land Classification Order No. SC-04-002 implements the 2005 Bristol 
Bay Area Plan (BBAP) and classifies the majority of lands within the 
current Pebble Project area as “Mineral Land,” or “land where known 
mineral resources exist and where development is occurring or is 
reasonably likely to occur, or where there is reason to believe that 
commercial quantities of minerals exist.”238 Under this order, DNR’s 
general resource management intent for the “Pebble Copper” area is to 
accommodate mineral exploration and development.239 Accordingly, the 
Pebble claims holder’s expectation that it will be able to mine is not just 
its own, but it is also the State’s. Given the immediate right to mine 
under Alaska mining law, the State’s stated intentions regarding the 
development of the Pebble area, and the expectation that the claims will 
be developed and mined, Pebble has a convincing argument that it has a 
“reasonable investment-backed expectation” that it will be able to mine 
its claims. 
 
 234. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.205 (2008). 
 235. ADNR Fact Sheet, supra note 232, at 1; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, 
§ 86.800(a) (2008) (requiring an approved plan of operations in lieu of a land use 
permit for mining on unleased land). 
 236. Freese v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 1, 10 (Fed. Cl. 1984). 
 237. Anderson v. State ex rel. Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 
710, 715 (Alaska 2003) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 
(1984)). 
 238. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 55.130 (2008). 
 239. ALASKA DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., DIV. OF MINING, LAND & WATER, BRISTOL 
BAY AREA PLAN FOR STATE LANDS 3-111, 3-175 (2005). 
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B. Analysis of Alaska Takings Law and Pebble Mine 
Alaska courts recognize two classes of per se takings: (1) where 
there is a physical invasion, and (2) where a regulation denies a 
landowner all economically feasible use of his property.240 In Alaska, 
private property is taken or damaged for constitutional purposes if the 
government deprives the owner of the economic advantages of 
ownership.241 The “economic advantages incident to ownership” of 
unimproved property have been construed as “the potential for 
appreciation and the opportunity for development.”242 
There are several instances where courts denied per se takings 
claims because the litigated statute, ordinance, or regulation did not 
deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial property uses. For 
instance, in Zerbetz v. Anchorage,243 the Alaska Supreme Court held that 
Anchorage’s designation of property as “conservation wetlands” did not 
deprive the owner of the “economic advantages of ownership” when the 
property could still be developed as long as the developer submitted 
water flow data, soil samples, and habitat information.244 Similarly, in 
Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Anchorage,245 the supreme court held there was not 
a per se taking where the municipality’s withholding of final occupancy 
certificates did not prevent the developer from constructing houses on 
affected lots and selling them to third parties.246 
Neither of these cases, however, involved a regulatory taking based 
on a legislative enactment that rendered it practically impossible to 
make any economically beneficial use of the property consistent with an 
already-acquired proprietary interest in the affected parcel of land. A 
mining claim is a limited form of property whose value is limited to the 
right to mine—if that right is economically foreclosed, the claim is 
valueless to the claimholder. 
A recent Ohio case involving a regulatory taking of mining rights 
under similar circumstances suggests that a measure such as House Bill 
 
 240. Beluga Mining Co. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 973 P.2d 570, 575 
(Alaska 1999). 
 241. Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage School Dist., 791 P.2d 610, 614 
(Alaska 1990). 
 242. Id. at 614 n.6 (citing Stewart & Grindle, Inc. v. State, 524 P.2d 1242, 1247 
(Alaska 1974)). 
 243. 856 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1993). 
 244. Id. at 783. 
 245. 78 P.3d 692 (Alaska 2003). 
 246. Id. at 702; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (denial of 
developer’s large scale development plans was not a taking when part of the 
property was still available for single family development). 
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134247 would result in a per se taking. In the 1980s, R.T.G., Inc. (RTG), a 
coal mining company, acquired approximately five hundred acres of 
coal-bearing property in Ohio.248 RTG held a portion of the property in 
fee simple and owned or leased the coal rights in the rest.249 In June 
1994, most of RTG’s property was designated as unfit for mining (UFM) 
due to the presence of a sole-source aquifer.250 Consequently, RTG was 
prevented from mining much of its property.251 RTG filed an action in 
state court alleging a regulatory taking of its land.252 The case was 
ultimately decided by the Ohio Supreme Court. The court concluded 
that a taking had occurred: 
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be 
exercised with profit. The UFM designation makes it 
impossible for R.T.G. to mine coal, thereby depriving R.T.G. 
from exercising its coal rights for profit. Thus imposition of the 
UFM designation deprived R.T.G.’s coal rights of all economic 
value. Accordingly, applying Lucas, we hold that the UFM 
designation resulted in a categorical taking of R.T.G.’s coal 
rights.253 
It made no difference to the court whether RTG owned the land in 
fee simple or leased the coal: “coal rights are severable and may be 
considered as a separate property interest if the property owner’s intent 
was to purchase the property solely for the purpose of mining the 
coal.”254 In so ruling, the court: (1) determined that RTG had been 
completely deprived of the value of its coal rights, and (2) upheld a 
portion of an earlier decision which applied a categorical takings test to 
land where RTG owned or leased coal rights.255 In other words: 
Unlike other individual rights . . . that make up a complete 
property estate, mineral rights are recognized by Ohio law as 
separate property rights. Therefore, because the ownership of 
the coal is “both severable and of value in its own right, it is 
 
 247. See Parker et al., supra note 1, at 37. 
 248. State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Ohio 2002). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 1002. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1009 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922)). 
 254. Id. at 1008. 
 255. Id. at 1011. 
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appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that 
particular property interest.”256 
The Ohio decision would likely be consistent with the result the 
Alaska Supreme Court would reach if confronted with a taking of the 
Pebble claims. Mineral rights in Alaska, like those in Ohio, are 
recognized by law as separate property rights.257 Payment of just 
compensation where mining claims are rendered economically valueless 
due to a change in land use designation is not a novel concept in Alaska. 
Miners in the former Kantishna mining district near Denali National 
Park and Preserve received compensation for the taking of federal 
mining claims that occurred when the mining district was incorporated 
into the national park boundary.258 One miner received approximately 
$662,500 to settle his takings claim.259 The Kantishna Mining Company 
was awarded approximately $1,000,000 in compensation for its takings 
claim.260 Thus, it is well established that mining rights are property 
rights in Alaska. 
The Parker article used the Alaska Supreme Court decision in 
Beluga Mining Co. v. State Department of Natural Resources261 to come to a 
different conclusion regarding Pebble’s regulatory takings analysis. In 
that case, Beluga Mining held “mining claims” on lands held in trust by 
the State for the benefit of the Alaska Mental Health Lands Trust.262 A 
preliminary injunction prevented the State from issuing mining leases 
on the trust lands.263 Unable to mine its “claims,” Beluga abandoned 
them and sued the State.264 The court found that there was not a taking, 
holding that “Beluga had property rights in its claims, but it had no 
right to mine; its mining ‘rights’ were prospective and contingent, and 
were subject to existing claims.”265 
There are crucial differences between the Pebble claim and the facts 
in Beluga. Most importantly, there was a prior claim to the Beluga 
mining locations by the plaintiffs in the Alaska Mental Health Lands 
 
 256. Id. at 1008 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. 470, 520 (1987)). 
 257. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 11; ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.05.185–.275 
(2008). 
 258. See Lawrence V. Albert, ANILCA Promises Broken: The Demise of the 
Kantishna Mining District, in (D)2 PART 2 42, 52 (J.P. Tangen ed.,  2000). 
 259. Id. at 50. 
 260. In re Gold King Mines, Inc., 8A.B.R. 35, 40 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2004), 
http://www.akb.uscourts.gov/8abr35.pdf. 
 261. 973 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1999). 
 262. Id. at 572. 
 263. Id. at 573. 
 264. Id. at 574. 
 265. Id. at 575. 
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Trust litigation.266 Section 38.05.275 of the Alaska Statutes makes mining 
locations subject to existing claims. The court held that the injunction 
that prevented mining was the result of the pre-existing claims.267 
Beluga had the option to seek modification of the preliminary injunction 
that prevented the State from issuing leases on the mental health trust 
lands, but it did not do so.268 Furthermore, Beluga abandoned its 
leasehold locations by failing to make annual rental payments.269 
Based on the holding in Beluga, the Parker article asserts that the 
“holder of a state mining claim . . . has ‘no right to mine’ because that 
right is always contingent on state permission.”270 DNR determined that 
Beluga needed a state mining lease before mining commenced.271 Beluga 
held leasehold locations in the trust lands, not “mining claims” as the 
term is used throughout the court’s opinion. Conversely, the Pebble 
locations are all mining claims and thus no lease is required before 
mining may begin.272 In other words, the owner of a mining claim, as 
opposed to a leasehold location, holds all of the property interests 
required to mine. Unlike Beluga’s “prospective and contingent” 
leasehold locations which were subject to the State’s granting a lease, 
Pebble’s mining claims are a present, vested property right. 
Additionally, the Beluga court concluded that the mining company 
lacked sufficient “reasonable investment-backed expectations” because 
the development of its claims proceeded in the face of litigation 
asserting adverse claims to its property.273 Beluga constructed its Mental 
Health Lands Trust claims while the Weiss litigation was pending.274 
Beluga proceeded with its case despite the fact that the Weiss decision 
“left open the question of whether the claims of parties like Beluga were 
superior to the claims of the Weiss plaintiffs.”275 The circumstances of 
Beluga were unique and unlikely to be present for other mining claim 
holders. Further, the “existing claims” language in section 38.05.275 of 
 
 266. State v. Weiss, 706 P.2d 681, 681–84 (Alaska 1985). Plaintiffs asserted that 
lands granted by the federal government to the Territory of Alaska in the Alaska 
Mental Health Enabling Act were to have been held in trust and not 
administered as general public lands. Id. 
 267. Beluga Mining Co. v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 973 P.2d 570, 575 
(Alaska 1999). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 574. 
 270. Parker, supra note 1, at 44. 
 271. Beluga, 973 P.2d at 573. 
 272. See ADNR Fact Sheet, supra note 229, at 1; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 
11, § 86.800(a) (2008) (requiring an approved plan of operations in lieu of a land 
use permit for mining on unleased land). 
 273. Beluga, 973 P.2d at 576. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
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the Alaska Statutes applies to protect prior claimants from overstaking 
by latter claimants. Where there are not any competing claimants, and 
no litigation which could cloud the land status of a claim, there could be 
no “existing claims” such as the ones in Beluga. 
Further, the court’s holding in Beluga turns on the fact that the 
preliminary injunction delayed, but did not terminate, the permitting 
process.276 The injunction simply delayed Beluga’s ability to obtain 
permission to mine and did not deprive Beluga of its underlying claims. 
Beluga’s failure to make the annual rental payments—not the State’s 
enforcement of the statutory scheme—caused the loss of Beluga’s 
claims.277 Thus, in Beluga, the claimholder’s own dilatory conduct 
resulted in the loss of its claims. This was not due to state action—a 
distinction that upends the entire regulatory takings analysis as applied 
to the Beluga decision. In sum, Beluga appears to have limited 
application in assessing takings claims by other mining claimants. 
Furthermore, the Alaska Legislature determined that it would need to 
pay just compensation to holders of mineral rights were it to enact a law 
having the same effect as House Bill 134.278 The Legislative Counsel 
concluded: 
When a person acquires mineral rights through discovery, 
location, and filing, that person acquires a property interest 
that requires the state to pay just compensation if the property 
is taken either as a per se taking or a regulatory taking that 
deprives the owner of all economic use of the interest.279 
In reaching this conclusion, the Legislative Counsel was asked to 
analyze the potential effects if “the federal or state government limit[ed] or 
preclude[ed] the development of a mine on state land that was open to 
mineral development and [was] being developed by a mining 
company.”280 
This conclusion is particularly significant because it was reached by 
counsel for the body that would be responsible for paying just 
compensation—the Alaska Legislature.281 The Legislative Counsel 
concluded that a person acquires the right to possess and extract minerals 
on state land not closed to mining claims merely “by satisfying . . . three 
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requirements—discovery, location, and filing.”282 The Counsel confirmed 
with DNR that DNR “does not have discretion in the granting of mineral 
rights,” so long as the statutory requirements are met: 
In other words, a person whose rights are not subservient to a 
prior interest holder, who acquires the rights by following the 
statutory requirements, and who maintains those rights by 
satisfying the annual work and rental payment requirements, 
has the rights to those minerals.283 
The Legislative Counsel also noted that “the land on which the 
proposed Pebble Gold Project may be developed is classified as available 
for mineral development as part of the Bristol Bay Area Plan.”284 
CONCLUSION 
It is the Authors’ view that the Parker article did not present a 
balanced perspective on potential mining projects in Alaska, nor did it 
provide a comprehensive overview of the permitting schemes that 
would evaluate the potential environmental impacts of any such mine. 
This Article provides a more comprehensive overview in order to make 
Alaska practitioners aware that an extensive environmental 
review required for the permitting process is already in place to protect 
Alaska’s natural heritage. 
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